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Introduction
Democratic peace refers to the very stable empirical observation that democracies rarely go to war with one another, but are not immune from fighting wars with nondemocracies. 1 The present paper is a contribution to the theoretic literature which aims to explain democratic peace with informational advantages of democracies.
2 This strand of literature originated in Fearon's (1994) famous paper on audience costs. Audience costs theory claims that democracies are better able to signal their intentions because democratic leaders incur audience costs if they make threats that they later fail to follow through. In contrast, statements of politically unaccountable dictators are considered to lack that source of credibility because they are able to bluff without facing domestic costs.
Despite the prominence of audience costs theory (Snyder and Borghard (2011) count over 400 references in scholarly journals), the actual relevance of audience costs in real world crisis bargaining could not be verified in empirical studies. 3 Also, Snyder and Borghard point out that, in historical cases, public threats are rarely unambiguous which prevents leaders to be held fully accountable for failed threats and the audience costs argument to unfold. Weeks (2008) , on the other hand, argues that democracies need not be unique in their ability to raise audience costs. She identifies various sources of audience costs in autocracies and, on these grounds, concludes that a signaling advantage for democratic leaders based on audience costs does not exist.
The main problem of audience costs theory may be the strict assumptions on which it is based. 4 The theory only works if domestic audiences always have the same preferences as their leader and care so much about empty threats to remove the leader from office even though the political outcome is in their best interest.
1 see for example Oneal and Russett (1997) and Maoz and Abdolali (1989) 2 for a critical appreciation of democratic peace theory see Rosato (2003) 3 for an overview of empirical studies on audience costs see Gartzke (2012) 4 see Snyder and Borghard (2011) 4
In the present paper, I aim to maintain the explanatory power of democracies' signaling advantage over autocracies which is widely supported by empirical tests.
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However, I will significantly change the way that leads to this signaling advantage by relaxing assumptions and creating a different theoretic model. Since it is basically the logical and empirical discrepancies inherent to the notion of audience costs that cause grounds for concern, I hope to provide an alternative, more convincing theoretic justification of democracies' general preponderance to overcome information asymmetries. More specifically, the present model predicts that the principal-agent relationship, which naturally arises within democratic systems, can explain democracies' signaling advantage.
For that purpose, the present model starts with a standard war bargaining set-up and relaxes the assumption that considers bargaining parties to be unitary entities which either act alone and according to their own ideas (autocratic leaders: A) or implicitely share the same preferences and goals as the people they represent (democratic representatives: R). 6 I distinguish between the two regime types by assuming that democratic constituents have different preferences and that, in contrast to autocracies, representatives are elected to act on behalf of the majority's preferences. Two problems can arise in this kind of setting: First, the representative may not be fully aware of the current majority situation because he does not know the preferences of each and every constituent in each and every bargaining case. Second, the representative may have preferences of his own and be inclined to follow his own and not the majority's preferences.
The present model particularly addresses these problems and shows that they enable democratic leaders to overcome informational asymmetries, given that a functioning election process is in place. This implies that, with the same strength in explaining democracies' signaling advantage, the present approach uses less severe assumptions and more realistic modeling than the audience costs approach and may therefore provide a more substantial theoretic underpinning of the democratic peace phenomenon.
Related Literature
Contributions to the democratic peace literature are extensive and diverse. Rosato Game-theoretic models of democratic peace can be crudely separated based on the underlying concept of war initiation. Following Fearon (1995) , models based on the expected utility argument assume that two states opt for war if the expected utility from war outweighs the expected costs. Any such framework disregards the possibility of bargaining. Once bargaining is allowed, the expected utility approach becomes moot as it cannot explain why two states fail to negotiate a mutually beneficial settlement.
For a bargaining framework, Fearon (1995) identifies two main rationalist reasons why agreements may become impossible: commitment problems and information asymmetries. 7 According to Fearon, a rationalist reason for war must explain why states cannot agree on a negotiated settlement and thereby avoid the costs of war. This rationalist reasons approach is taken here, as I provide a theoretic model that explains why democracies can overcome information asymmetries and this rationalist reason for war dissolves.
In this sense, the paper is closely related to Ramsay (2004) The model in Debs and Goemans (2010) also has an expected utility approach at 7 heart and in this respect differs from the present approach. They argue that peace prevails when the cost of a leader's survival probability depends relatively little on the war outcome and the net gain of staying in office is relatively small, attributes that they rather associate with democratic leaders than autocratic leaders.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the crisis bargaining model, section 3 introduces democracies, section 4 provides a discussion of empirical implications and future research, section 5 concludes. That is, c i reflects party i's costs of war relative to any possible benefits. In practice, low costs of war translate into a high outside option or high resolve, which means that the issue at stake is highly valued and going to war a viable option at relatively small costs. On the other hand, if a party sees little to gain from winning war, then c i would be large even if the actual costs, incurred by war, were small.
The Model
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War can occur in this kind of setting when there is asymmetric information about the opponent's resolve and it may be beneficial to make a low offer which only low resolve types accept. Asymmetric information can be introduced either by assuming that the parties have private information about the probability to win a war, which 8 see Fearon (1995) 8 basically refers to military ressources, or private information about the costs of war, which will be applied here. As stated above, high costs of war immediately result in a low outside option and low costs of war in a high outside option.
The asymmetry in information is modeled as follows: From A's point of view, player B's outside option is low (w l B ) with probability 0 < β < 1 and high (w h B ) with probability 1 − β, with w l B < w h B . Equally, player B believes that A's outside option is low (weak type) with probability 0 < α < 1 and high (strong type) with probability 1 − α. In contrast to the case of asymmetric information about military resources, in the case of asymmetric information about costs, a mutually beneficial bargaining outcome always exists, even when two strong types negotiate, w
For simplification, I assume that one of the bargainers is selected at random to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which the opponent accepts if and only if this offer meets at least her outside option w i . Otherwise, she opts out and both parties receive their respective outside option payoffs.
Introducing Democracies
In the basic model of two unitary actors, as for instance in Powell (1996) , neither state can convince the opponent that his level of resolve is, in fact, real because either state can easily renege upon prior commitments and simply lie. Therefore, a state may have an incentive to screen the opponent's type and make an offer which is only acceptable to the weak type, leading to war whenever the opponent is strong. Consequently, the conditions for war can be stated as follows:
Conditions for War in the Unitary Actor Case:
1. A makes a screening offer:
Condition 1 states that it is optimal for player A given his type w with probability β which is the probability that B is weak and will accept a low offer w l B . With probability 1−β, however, B is strong and refuses to accept such low offer. In this case, war occurs and A obtains his outside option w i A . A pooling offer (right hand side) is accepted by weak and strong types and is thus a riskless profit for the proposer.
Condition 2 essentially states the same with the roles of the players reversed. Generally, when a state makes a screening offer, the probability of war is positive and equals the probability that the opponent is strong. Making a screening offer is less attractive for weak types because they have a low outside option and therefore a smaller expected profit from making such offer compared to strong types. Also, screening offers become less attractive, the higher the probability of a strong opponent.
In the following analysis, I aim to show that a state does not have an incentive to make a screening offer to a democratic opponent, independent of his own type and the probability of a strong opponent, as long as the democratic leader is sufficiently interested in reelection.
For that purpose, assume that party A is still a single actor (an autocracy or, alternatively, a group with equal preferences), whereas party B consists of a continuum of individual players, normalized to unity, who entrust one political representative, denoted R, to bargain on their behalf. Again player A, the autocrat, is either a weak type with probability α or a strong type with probability 1 − α. Furthermore, a critical majority in B is weak with probability β and strong with probability 1 − β. This implies that the population is composed of two types of individuals: individuals who have little costs of war and mostly benefit and individuals who do not care to go to war because their costs of war are high. This modeling approach is a natural extension of the unitary actor approach. When we think of different costs of war as different preferences regarding war and assume that war is possible because these preferences are private information, then in the unitary actor case, only the unitary actors' preferences matter. This is not true for democracies. In democracies, given a functioning election process, the preferences of many individuals are important and eventually majority rules. So, I think it is a logical step to endow democratic voters with preferences and integrate the majority's preferences into the analysis.
I assume that, first the representative (agent) receives a signal s ∈ {w l B , w h B } about the majority's type, which is accurate with probability 1 2 < q < 1 and second, that the agent is unbiased R u with probability p and biased R b with probability 1 − p, where the realized type is the agent's private information.
At this point, it is important to stress that all leaders are agents to some principal, with the difference that the principal in democratic countries is an aggregation of a large number of individuals. This is the key difference between autocracy and democracy in this model, when we consider an autocracy as just another variant of a principle-agent relationship. An autocratic leader answers only to a small number of individuals and it seems plausible that he actually learns their preferences without publicity. On the other hand, a democratic leader cannot possibly learn the preferences of all the voters privately. His only way of narrowing them down is to rely on a public signal. This signal may subsume polls, media reports, and legislative debates and informs not only the democratic leader about what his voters want but also the opponent. The signal being imperfect and public is a direct consequence of the principal being an aggregation of a large number of individuals in democracies. This creates a principal-agent problem in the sense that the signal may be wrong and the outcome not in line with majority's interests.
It is important for this model to work that the signal about the principal's preferences in autocracies is private and in democracies it is public. But this alone does not explain democratic peace. Because even though the signal is public in democracies, it is not as if the opponent knows from the outset what a democratic leader will do. Of course, observing the signal can help the opponent update his belief about the principal's type, however, the democratic leader's type is still private information and 11 unknown to the opponent.
The analysis and results very much depend on how the democratic leader types are characterized and what the majority's preferences are with regard to her leader. The following paragraph describes the crucial assumptions on which the model is based:
First, I assume that the majority prefers an unbiased leader who is truly committed to the majority's interests and not his own. Second, an unbiased agent is only interested in maximizing the majority's bargaining outcome, not in reelection and not in his own type. Third, a biased agent does not derive utility from serving the majority but cares only about his own type, which is either weak (with probability β) or strong (with probability 1 − β), dependent on whether he puts little or much value on the issue at stake. Besides the share that the biased agent receives through bargaining, he also cares about reelection and thus cares about how he is perceived by the critical majority.
In the following, I will equate "critical majority" with "principal" to implie that the agent's reelection concerns are tied to the critical majority which decides whether the agent is retained for future periods or removed from office. Note, that it is not important that an unbiased type even exists. It suffices that the principal has an idea about how an ideal candidate should act which I assume is to maximize the principal's expected payoff from bargaining.
The principal observes the bargaining outcome θ and refers the representative's type. The principal's belief that the representative is unbiased, given the bargaining outcome, is P r(u | θ). The payoff to the agent is then given by
for an unbiased agent, where EU(P (θ)) is the principal's expected payoff from bargaining and Making the payoff for a biased agent conditional on the principal's ex post assessment of the agent's type is a common specification in the literature on career concerns in principal-agent relationships. In the political context considered here, one could motivate the assumption by suggesting that the probability that the representative will be reelected increases in the posterior P r(u | θ).
The payoff to the principal depends on the bargaining outcome and the posterior distribution:
The principal's payoff mirrors her two objectives. One is to maximize her expected payoff from bargaining. Another is to obtain information about the agent's type which becomes relevant when she needs to decide whether to retain the agent for future, unmodeled periods or hire another one.
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Nature determines the outside option payoffs and whether R is biased.
2. R receives a signal about the majority's type 3. Bargaining game: Upon random selection, either R or A makes a take-it-or-leaveit offer to the opponent.
4. The public observes the bargaining outcome and infers the agent's type.
5. R receives a payoff based on the public's inferences (posterior of R's type) and the bargaining outcome.
13
The public's inference about R's type can be determined as follows, using Bayes's rule:
There are two possible reasons for war in this set-up. One, R rejects an offer and two, R's offer gets rejected. As shown in the Appendix, it is not possible to restrict R's offer in a way that leads to peaceful acceptance by the opponent as long as the opponent is an autocracy. This is why, in the following analysis, I focus on the first possible reason for war and define conditions that are necessary for the opponent's offer to get accepted by a democratic agent. If the conditions hold, then war does not occur whenever the opponent makes the offer because in the face of reelection concerns, democratic agents coordinate on a single acceptance rule independent of their individual types. Lemma 1 suggests that both, the opponent and the principal, know how an unbiased representative is supposed to react given the signal and its quality. Since he cannot be 9 In the analysis, the players are restricted to pure strategies. 14 sure about the principal's actual type, the unbiased agent demands compensation for this uncertainty whenever the signal is low and makes concessions whenever the signal is high. Based on the principal's knowledge of the unbiased agent's optimal response, the biased agents coordinate on the same strategy if they put sufficient value on reelection.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, an unbiased agent accepts only an offer x ≥ w
In equilibrium, this is anticipated by the opponent who makes an appropriate offer which is accepted. Proof. It is easy to check that for < q < 1, a strong biased agent also rejects an offer x < x * . The only plausible candidate for accepting an offer x would be the weak biased type. The opponent only has an incentive to make a screening offer x, acceptable to the weak biased type, if
Proposition 1 When reelection is sufficiently important to biased agents relative to potential gains from bargaining, so that
Now we need to verify that it is still optimal for A to offer x * by showing that also the weak biased type rejects an offer w 
for P r(u | x < x * ) = 0.
The weak biased type is ready to reject an offer that is higher than his outside option if reputational concerns are high. In this case, he is ready to accept personal costs from the bargaining outcome, which is going to war despite high personal costs of war, because these costs are offset by a higher reelection probability which also creates utility.
Next, we need to verify that a strong biased type accepts the offer x * , even though
since P r(u | x * ) = p. If this condition holds, then the strong biased agent prefers accepting x * over rejecting it because his reputational gains outweigh his personal costs from accepting an offer below his outside option.
For such peaceful equilibrium response to work, it is important that the opponent observes the signal and that the biased types are eager to get reelected so that they imitate the unbiased type's equilibrium response. If one of the above incentive constraints (condition 2.3 and 2.4) fails to hold, the opponent's offer does not necessarily get accepted and war becomes possible. For example, if condition 2.3 fails, the weak biased type would accept an offer x ≤ x and the opponent has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy defined by Proposition 1 and make a screening offer which is rejected by the unbiased and the strong biased type. On the other hand, if condition 2.4 fails, the strong biased agent rejects the offer x * . The necessary conditions critically depend on the principal's posterior belief that the agent is unbiased
after observing war, P r(u | war).
In the following corollary, it will be shown that P r(u | war) and thus the necessary conditions depend on the principal being able to learn the actual offer and also distinguish between who the proposer and who the responder is. can be uniquely defined depending on the observed offer, as argued in Corollary 7 and 10 see for example Maoz and Abdolali (1989) the constraints can hold simultaneously. In the closed-door bargaining case, P r(u | war) becomes an off-the-equilibrium-path belief.
Corollary 1 How public the bargaining process is, matters in the democracy
To put some restriction on this belief, let us first consider the two scenarios in which war could possibly be observed by the principal: War could either occur if the proposer deviates from his equilibrium strategy and makes too low an offer for the responder to be acceptable or if the responder deviates from his equilibrium strategy and rejects the equilibrium offer. As for the first scenario, we should reasonably assume that P r(u | war) > 0 because the unbiased agent definitely rejects an offer x < x * .
At most P r(u | war) = p in this scenario, that is, if the offer is rejected by all types. When it comes to the second scenario, the intuitive criterion requires that P r(u | war) = 0 because the unbiased agent definitely accepts the equilibrium offer.
As long as both sides have positive proposal power, both scenarios are possible and the principal should place positive probability on the incidence of either scenario. It follows that the principal's belief that the agent is unbiased given that war can be observed lies somewhere between zero and p: 0 < Pr(u | war) < p. This is also exactly the range for which the biased agents' constraints (conditions 2.3 and 2.4) are viable.
Discussion
The above analysis implies that the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and her leader can eliminate information asymmetries and facilitate peaceful bargaining. In this section, I highlight some of the empirical implications of the analysis and point toward an interesting issue for future research.
Empirical Implications
The equilibrium strategies of the model point to a number of empirical implications relating democratic institution to the outcome of international crises. One such implication is that, offers to democracies tend to be less radical. To see why this is true, first note that according to Proposition 1, a democracy is offered x * = w Another empirical implication is tied to reelection which plays a crucial role in this model. As a matter of fact, when we take away the reelection concern, the model breaks down to the unitary actor case because biased agents have no longer an incentive to imitate the unbiased type in the hope of getting reelected. This means that democratic 20 peace critically depends on the specific structure of the underlying democratic system.
In particular, democratic leaders who do not face reelection, i.e. American presidents in their second term, should be more prone to war or at least equally prone to rejecting an offer as autocrats than leaders who are still viable for reelection, i.e. American presidents in their first term.
Remark 3 Democracies with a leader serving his final term are more likely to reject an offer in crisis bargaining resulting in war than democracies with a leader who is viable for reelection.
Future Research
In the model, I assume the signal's quality to be exogenous. 
Conclusion
The paper's aim is to show that the principal-agent structure of democracies dissolves information asymmetries and thus eliminates this rationalist reason for war. In contrast to previous works on that subject, this result is not obtained through a signaling model. There are no costly policy actions, no need of certain oppositional rhetorics or audience costs that give credibility to the leader's demands. Information asymmetries are overcome because democratic agents coordinate on a unique bargaining strategy, namely the strategy of the unbiased agent. Unbiased agents follow this strategy because it is the optimal strategy when the principal's type is uncertain and the objective is to maximize the principal's payoff. Biased agents follow this strategy, even though it may not be in their personal best interest, because they want to imitate the unbiased agent in order to get reelected. Biased agents are only ready to neglect personal bargaining gains if they get sufficient utility from reelection. So reelection is important. What is equally important is the publicity of the signal about the principal's type. Only if there is free press and media, public debates and freedom of speech, the signal can be considered public and only then knows the opponent which offer to make because the unbiased agent's minimum acceptable offer depends on the signal.
Another way of looking at the model is to accredit the democracy-specific principalagent problems with the democratic peace result. The two problems responsible for the result can then be subsumed as follows: First, the agent does not know the principal's type because the principal is an aggregation of a large number of individuals with different types, so the agent relies on an imperfect signal. Second, the principal does not know the agent's type because his type is private information, so the principal relies on an updated belief that the agent is the preferred unbiased type.
However we interpret the model, the main ingredient is the principal-agent relationship between a democratic public and its elected representative.
Appendix
In this section, I will provide some idea of how the democratic agent's offer to an autocracy looks like. As pointed out before, this offer does not essentially differ from offers between autocracies and depends on the agent's type and the probability that the opponent is weak or strong.
I will also provide proof that "A offering x * and this offer being always accepted" 
Since α < α for • For α w > α > max{α , α s }, the unbiased type and the strong biased type make a screening offer, while the weak biased type makes a pooling offer, so that P r(u | war) = P r(u | w l A ) = p p+ (1−β) (1−p) and P r(u | w h A ) = 0. In this case, 0 < P r(u | war) < p and peaceful acceptance of x * by all types is possible.
